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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
  Cecilio Ponce Alba appeals from his conviction for trafficking in 
methamphetamine. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 A grand jury indicted Alba on one count of conspiracy to traffic in 
methamphetamine and one count of trafficking in 400 or more grams of 
methamphetamine.  (R., pp. 26-31.)  The district court entered an order 
governing further proceedings.  (R., p. 50.)  The order established a May 16, 
2014 deadline for completing discovery, and a deadline 14 days later (May 30, 
2014) for pretrial motions governed by I.C.R. 12.  (R., p. 50.)  The order also set 
a pre-trial conference on June 24, 2014 and a 15-day trial start date of July 14, 
2014.1  (Id.) 
 On May 1, 2014, Alba filed a stipulation for substitution of counsel.  (R., p. 
57.)  On June 16, 2014, Alba filed a second stipulation for substitution of counsel.  
(R., p. 74.)  On June 24, 2014, less than an hour before the pre-trial conference 
started, Alba filed a motion to enlarge time to file a pretrial motion.  (R., pp. 77-
78; see R., p. 81 (pre-trial started at 3:30 on June 24, 2014).)  That same day 
and time Alba filed a motion to suppress evidence, claiming that the stop and 
search of his car had been illegal and that his confessions were coerced and in 
violation of Miranda.  (R., pp. 79-80.)  The district court scheduled a hearing on 
                                            
1 The district court later extended the trial start date two days, to July 16, 2014.  
(R., p. 70.)  The court would begin preliminary jury selection on the original trial 




the motion to enlarge three days later, on June 27, 2014.  (Tr., p. 16, L. 8 – p. 17, 
L. 2.)   
   At the hearing on the motion to enlarge, Alba’s counsel argued that he 
had not learned of the grounds for the motion to suppress until he substituted as 
counsel, after the deadline had passed.  (Tr., p. 33, L. 8 – p. 35, L. 2.)  The judge 
asked, “Apart from just a different interpretation of the merits of the motion to 
suppress, what good cause or excusable neglect did prior counsel have for not 
filing this?”  (Tr., p. 35, Ls. 18-21.)  Counsel answered: “Judge, I’m not sure—I 
cannot speak for prior counsel, I can just tell the court that my discussions with 
the defendant revealed these issues.”  (Tr., p. 35, Ls. 22-24.)  Counsel 
acknowledged that the information upon which the suppression motion would be 
based was “information that the defendant himself has had since day one.”  (Tr., 
p. 39, Ls. 2-6.)   Counsel asserted he was “not here to speak about prior 
counsel,” but asserted that the reason for substitution was relevant, and that 
reason was a conflict of interest.  (Tr., p. 48, L. 22 – p. 49, L. 5.)  It was not Alba’s 
then-counsel who had the conflict, however, but then-counsel’s partner.  (Tr., p. 
49, L. 6 – p. 50, L. 25.)  The district court found “zero good cause” and “zero 
excusable neglect” for the untimely filing and denied the motion to enlarge the 
time to file a motion to suppress.  (Tr., p. 51, L. 1 – p. 55, L. 8.) 
Alba entered a guilty plea to trafficking in 400 grams or more of 
methamphetamine, preserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to 
enlarge time to hear the motion to suppress, in exchange for dismissal of the 




proceeded to sentencing, where the district court imposed a sentence of 30 
years with 15 years determinate.  (R., pp. 123-25; Tr., p. 106, Ls. 13-18.)  Alba 






 Alba states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did the court err in denying Mr. Alba’s motion to extend the 
time to file his ICR 12(b) suppression motion? 
 
B. Did the court err in imposing an excessive sentence? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Alba failed to show that the district court erred by finding he had 
presented no basis for finding good cause or excusable neglect for failing to file a 
timely motion to suppress? 
 









Alba Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Finding He Had 
Presented No Basis For Finding Good Cause Or Excusable Neglect For Failing 




 The district court found that Alba had not established grounds for excusing 
his failure to comply with the applicable deadlines.  (Tr., p. 51, L. 1 – p. 55, L. 8.)  
On appeal, Alba claims that his substitution of counsel created good cause to file 
the untimely motion to suppress.  (Appellant‘s brief, p. 6.)  Alba’s argument is 
without merit. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 A district court’s factual findings will not be disturbed unless they are 
“clearly erroneous.”  Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 857, 230 P.3d 743, 749 
(2010).  A district court’s discretionary decisions are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion under a three-part test: “whether the trial court (1) rightly perceived the 
issues as ones of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that 
discretion and appropriately applied the legal principles to the facts found; and 
(3) reached its decision through an exercise of reason.”  Id. (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). 
 
C. Alba Has Failed To Show Error In The Factual Finding That He Failed To 
Show Good Cause Or Excusable Neglect 
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 12 provides specific deadlines for filing pre-trial 




provided herein.”  I.C.R. 12(d).2  A court also has discretion to “relieve a party of 
failure to comply with this rule” if that party shows “good cause” or “excusable 
neglect.”  I.C.R. 12(d).  Thus, the court’s discretion is contingent upon first finding 
good cause or excusable neglect.  State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888, 712 P.2d 
585, 589 (1985) (“To permit a court to [enlarge the time for filing a pre-trial 
motion] without the required exempting factors would emasculate the intent of the 
rule.”); State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 597, 887 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(“Idaho Criminal Rule 12(d) clearly requires either good cause or excusable 
neglect to be shown by a party who has missed prescribed deadlines.”).   
The district court found “zero good cause” and “zero excusable neglect.”  
(Tr., p. 53, Ls. 15-16.)  Those findings are fully supported by the record.  At the 
hearing on the motion to enlarge, Alba’s counsel proffered the reasons for the 
motion, which generally amounted to a claim that counsel, after substituting into 
the case after the deadline had passed, reviewed the information and, concluding 
it had merit, decided to file the motion.  (Tr., p. 33, L. 14 – p. 39, L. 1; see also 
Tr., p. 47, L. 22 – p. 50, L. 25.)  Counsel conceded that the information upon 
which the proffered suppression motion was based was held by Alba “since day 
one.”  (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 2-6.)  Because Alba presented no justification for why a 
timely motion was not filed, the district court correctly found no excusable neglect 
for failing to file a timely motion and no good cause for filing an untimely one.  
Because neither good cause nor excusable neglect was shown, the district court 
                                            
2 The district court used this discretion to set a deadline for motions to suppress.  
(R., p. 50.)  Alba did not challenge that discretionary decision below and does not 
do so on appeal.  Nor does Alba dispute that he missed the deadline by at least 




lacked discretion to allow the untimely motion.  Alanis, 109 Idaho at 888, 712 
P.2d at 589; Dice, 126 Idaho at 597, 887 P.2d at 1104. 
Alba first challenges the district court’s finding of no good cause or 
excusable neglect by claiming that substitution of counsel after the filing deadline 
had passed is per se good cause.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)  Alba goes so far as 
to say that substitution of counsel constituting good cause is a “[g]iven.”  (Id.)  No 
reasonable view of the law supports this argument. 
In making this argument, Alba relies entirely upon State v. Lenz, 103 
Idaho 632, 651 P.2d 566 (Ct. App. 1982).  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)  No reading of 
Lenz, especially in the context of later decisions, supports Alba’s argument. 
In Lenz, the state argued for the first time on appeal that Lenz’s motion to 
suppress, brought on the first day of trial, was untimely, and therefore the claim 
of error for denying that motion “was extinguished.”  Id. at 633, 651 P.2d at 567.  
The Court of Appeals rejected that argument as follows: 
In this case it appears that the court agreed to hear the motion at 
an otherwise untimely point in the proceedings because there had 
been a substitution of defense counsel immediately before trial. We 
do not believe that substitution of counsel requires a court to hear 
and decide an otherwise untimely motion, but we cannot say that 
the court here abused its discretion by doing so. Consequently, we 
hold that the first issue raised by Lenz has been preserved for 
appellate review. 
 
Id. (emphasis original).  Thus, the only holding was that Lenz’s claim of error for 
rejecting his motion on the merits was preserved.  The Court did not hold that a 
timely challenge resulting in factual findings that the party had failed to show 
good cause or excusable neglect would be erroneous.  Indeed, the statement 




court to hear an untimely motion belies Alba’s claim that it is a “[g]iven” that 
substitution of counsel amounts to good cause or excusable neglect. 
 Moreover, the notion that substitution of counsel alone constitutes good 
cause or excusable neglect is disproved by subsequent cases by the Idaho 
Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals.  In Alanis, the Idaho Supreme Court 
determined that showings of good cause or excusable neglect are “requirements 
for exemption from the rule’s filing requirements.”  109 Idaho at 887, 712 P.2d at 
588.  Thus, the court’s discretionary power to hear an untimely motion “may be 
exercised only for ‘good cause shown,’ of for ‘excusable neglect.’”  Id. at 888, 
712 P.2d at 589.  In Dice, the Court of Appeals stated that the rule “clearly 
requires either good cause or excusable neglect to be shown by a party who has 
missed the prescribed deadlines.”  126 Idaho at 597, 887 P.2d at 1104.  “If no 
good cause or excusable neglect [is] established to the satisfaction of the district 
court, the motion should not [be] heard.”  Id.   
Hearing the motion without requiring the showing of good cause or 
excusable neglect “would emasculate the intent of the rule.” Alanis, 109 Idaho at 
888, 712 P.2d at 589.  Hearing motions merely because they seem potentially 
meritorious “eviscerates the purpose of the rule.”  Dice, 126 Idaho at 597, 887 
P.2d at 1104.  Alba’s argument that a party without good cause or excusable 
neglect for missing the deadline can manufacture good cause or excusable 





Alba also argues that the district court erred by assuming “that prior 
counsel was acting in Mr. Alba’s best interests and that any failure to file a 
motion to suppress by that counsel was a tactical decision” because the 
substitution of counsel was based on a claim that prior counsel had a conflict of 
interest.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)  Alba cites no law for this claim; when actual 
law is reviewed the claim is quickly shown to be meritless.   
“It is presumed that trial counsel is competent and that trial tactics were 
based on sound legal strategy.”  Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 101, 982 P.2d 931, 
936 (1999) (citations omitted).  Counsel’s decision to not file a motion to 
suppress must be deemed tactical absent a contrary showing.  See State v. 
Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991).  A party claiming that 
counsel was ineffective because of a conflict of interests must show that those 
conflicting interests “actually affected the adequacy of [counsel’s] 
representation.”  Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171-72 (2001) (citing Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481-82 
(1978)).  Nothing in the record suggests, much less proves, that prior counsel 
was acting on a conflicting interest3 when he decided to not file a motion to 
suppress.  The district court did not improperly “assume” that prior counsel had 
made a tactical decision; Alba failed to meet his burden of proving that the 
decision was not tactical. 
                                            
3 The prosecutor represented that prior counsel did not have a conflict of 
interests, only prior counsel’s partner, and therefore “a Chinese wall” was 
sufficient to address the conflict.  (Tr., p. 49, Ls. 13-19.)  Alba ultimately did not 
dispute this representation or explain what conflict allegedly existed.  (Tr., p. 49, 




Alba also argues that “an extension would have furthered the purposes of 
the rule” because hearing the motion would not have inconvenienced jurors or 
deprived the state of the opportunity to gather evidence to meet the motion, and 
would have promoted judicial economy.   (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-8.)  Although 
these are all proper matters for the court to balance in exercising its discretion,4 
that balancing does not happen unless the party first shows good cause or 
excusable neglect.  Alanis, 109 Idaho at 888, 712 P.2d at 589; Dice, 126 Idaho at 
597, 887 P.2d at 1104. 
The district court correctly found “zero” good cause or excusable neglect.  
Because there was neither good cause nor excusable neglect, the district court 
had no discretion to grant the motion to enlarge time and hear the untimely 




Alba Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion 
 
 The district court imposed a sentence of 30 years with 15 years 
determinate upon Alba’s conviction for trafficking in 400 grams or more of 
methamphetamine.  (R., pp. 123-25; Tr., p. 106, Ls. 13-18.)  The sentencing 
                                            
4 The state has not here included “concern for justice” (defined as refusal to 
consider a potentially meritorious motion) as a properly considered factor 
because it is based on a dissent rejected by the Court.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8 
(citing Alanis, 109 at 890, 712 P.2d at 591 (Huntley, J., dissenting).)  If it were 
unjust to not hear a motion because it was untimely then there is no reason for 
showings of good cause or excusable neglect, or even for deadlines, in the first 
place.  See Dice, 126 Idaho at 597, 887 P.2d at 1104 (“Allowing untimely motions 





range available to the district court was a mandatory minimum of 10 years 
determinate, extending up to life.  I.C. § 37-2732B(4).  The district court 
considered the proper legal standard (Tr., p. 102, L. 19 – p. 103, L. 3); found that 
Alba was a “drug trafficker in every sense of the word” because he was a 
professional seller of drugs, that he sold methamphetamine as part of an 
“ongoing enterprise,” and that he was the top of that enterprise as concerning the 
State of Idaho (Tr., p. 103, L. 4 – p. 105, L. 7); and that the best way to protect 
society was to “remove [Alba] from society” (Tr., p. 105, L. 24 – 106, L. 4). 
Application of the correct legal standards to the facts found by the district court 
shows that the sentence was within the court’s discretion. 
 Alba argues that his “background, his cooperation upon arrest, and his 
LSI-R score” show that the “mandatory minimum was sufficient to meet the 
Toohill sentencing goals.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  Alba acknowledges that his 
“background” includes a “prior felony conviction” and his claim of “cooperation” 
consists entirely of pointing out he admitted he “brought as many as 30 pounds 
of methamphetamine to Boise since the summer of 2013.”  (Id.)  Review of the 
additional facts about Alba and his crime further erodes his claims of abuse of 
discretion. 
For example, the crime of conviction involved bringing four pounds of 
methamphetamine to Boise from California; Alba bought the methamphetamine 
for $16,000 and expected to sell it for $32,000; Alba brought “between twenty-
five (25) and thirty (30) pounds” of Methamphetamine into the Boise area 




arrested in November 2013 with five pounds of methamphetamine and a gun.  
(PSI, p. 1.)  Thus, taking the minimum amount of methamphetamine trafficked, 
Alba averaged bringing better than 3.5 pounds of methamphetamine to Idaho per 
month. This does not count the five pounds of methamphetamine in his 
possession when he was arrested in California about three months before 
committing the current trafficking crime.    
In addition, although Alba acknowledges his 2007 California conviction for 
transport or sale of a controlled substance, he does not acknowledge his pending 
California charges for possession with intent, transport of controlled substances, 
felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a controlled substance while 
armed.  (PSI, p. 4.)  Given that Alba committed this crime after a prior felony 
conviction in 2007 and a felony drug arrest only two months prior, the district 
court’s finding of a risk to society was amply supported.  Alba has shown no 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Alba’s judgment and 
sentence. 
 DATED this 27th day of January, 2016. 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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